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Abstract
Growing interest in the analysis of interrelationships between income distribu-
tion and economic growth has recently stimulated new theoretical and empirical 
research. Measures such as the head-count ratio for the poverty index or the widely 
used Gini coefficient are aggregated indicators describing the general extent of 
inequality without deeper insights into income distribution among households. To 
derive an indicator accounting for income distribution among income groups, we 
propose a new approach based on an output oriented DEA model where the input 
value is unitized to 1 for each country and weights restrictions imposed so as to 
favour a higher income share in the lower quantiles. We demonstrate the merits of 
this approach on the quintile income breakdown data of 29 European countries. Pri-
oritizing lower income groups’ welfare, countries such as Slovenia and Slovakia can 
be equally favoured by the new proposed indicator while being assessed differently 
by the Gini index. An intertemporal analysis reveals a slight deterioration of income 
distribution in the majority of 29 European countries over the period of 2007–2016 
in a Rawlsian sense.
Keywords Income distribution · Rawlsian utility · Data envelopment analysis · 
Weights restriction · Malmquist index
1 Introduction
Income distribution and its relation to economic activity and social welfare have 
become one of the main interests of numerous theoretical and empirical studies over 
the last three decades. Some of these papers are based on social welfare functions 
and assess the trade-off between efficiency and equity (Nicola 2013).
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An empirical analysis of welfare and economic performance involves account-
ing for multiple socio-economic characteristics. Welfare depends on both the 
size and distribution of national income. With its capacity to account for mul-
tiple inputs and outputs, data envelopment analysis (DEA) has proved to be an 
appropriate tool in this domain. Prasada Rao and Coelli (1998, 2002) were the 
first to embed inequality indicator in the measuring of economic performance. 
Lábaj et al. (2014) later derived a measure of social welfare which simultaneously 
assesses economic, ecological, and social dimensions. Using DEA the overall 
change in productivity described by the Malmquist index can be decomposed to 
expose catch-up and frontier-shift effects (see e.g. Färe et al. 1994; Cooper et al. 
2007).
As pointed out by Nicola (2013, p. vi), many indicators of welfare other than 
income, e.g. education, good health, or happiness show a positive correlation 
between per capita income and a satisfaction score. A new indicator for measur-
ing economic performance beyond GDP which includes inequality was developed 
by Jones and Klenow (2016).
Statistically based studies that measure income distribution indicate a widen-
ing gap between the income of rich and poor individuals during the last three 
decades (e.g. Atkinson 2015; Atkinson et al. 2011). Following Feldstein (2005), 
“the emphasis should be on eliminating poverty and not on the overall distribu-
tion of income or the general extent of inequality. Like most economists, I accept 
the Pareto principle that an economy is better off if someone gains and no one 
loses. This is true even if the gainer has above-average income, causing a Gini 
coefficient measure of income distribution to shift to greater inequality”, (p. 12). 
Atkinson (2015) supports this view: “I share his concern with what is happening 
at the bottom of the income scale” (p. 23).
The simplest way to extract the poverty indicator from income distribution 
is to define an income value, ymin, and to declare as poor those people with an 
income that does not exceed it. However, this so-called head-count ratio does not 
take into account income distribution among individuals in this group. For the 
same Gini coefficient, the income share of the poorest group in relation to total 
income can be different. A deeper insight in the structure of the inequality meas-
ure is needed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted 
to the measurement of income distribution based on DEA methodology. As the 
evaluation of income distribution encompasses both descriptive and prescrip-
tive issues (Sen 2000), some preferences need to be included in the prospec-
tive method. In the spirit of Rawls and following Feldstein (2005) we introduce 
decreasing weighting for income quantile shares, with the highest weight for the 
poorest group. A assurance region DEA model is employed to implement these 
weight restrictions. A method of assessing of productivity change over time using 
the Malmquist index is presented afterwards. In Sect. 3 empirical results are pre-
sented to demonstrate how the proposed measure performs compared to the Gini 
index, providing deeper insight into individual distributions in 29 European coun-
tries. The intertemporal analysis spans the period of 2007–2016. Section 4 con-
cludes and outlines further research.
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2  Measurement of inequalities
Over the years, a multitude of indices haves been developed to facilitate the design-
ing and evaluating of policies with respect to social development. Most of them aim 
to capture aspects beyond GDP utilizing a range of indicators, famously articulated 
in Stiglitz et  al. (2009). Leaving aside environmental issues, the most discussed 
aspect of well-being is social justice, particularly the distribution of wealth. There 
are a number of indicators capturing the distribution of wealth or income on an 
aggregate level, including the Gini or Theil indices as a class of statistically based 
indicators. These indices are closely linked to social welfare functions. Quantities 
characterizing health or education are closely correlated with income. This is why 
income distribution analyses dominate the domain of the social aspect of well-being 
research.
Measures like the head-count ratio for the poverty index or the widely used Gini 
coefficient do not provide deeper insights into income distribution among the differ-
ent types of households. It is important to know not only the surface generated by 
the Lorenz curve for the estimation of the Gini coefficient but also the curvature of 
this curve. Adopting the definition of justice as representing “…the basic structure 
of society” (Rawls 1971) and Feldstein’s (2005) focus on eliminating poverty, we 
would value overall welfare with respect to the lowest income. We deviate from the 
strict max–min principle, maintaining however the spirit of lower incomes’—greater 
contribution to total welfare. Since detailed data on income brackets are hardly 
available for a study across European countries, we make use of income distribution 
data where income shares per population quantiles are accessible. The more income 
is received by the poorest, the higher “Rawlsian” social welfare would be generated.
2.1  Measurement of inequalities with a weight restriction in DEA
In order to provide deeper insights into income distribution among the differ-
ent income groups, e.g. quantiles of households by level of income) and, thus, to 
reveal the potential for reducing income inequalities we propose a modified DEA 
model. DEA was originally developed for measuring efficiency and evaluating the 
performance of many different kinds of entities engaged in many different activities 
(Charnes et al. 1978). Applications of DEA include evaluations of the performance 
of cities, regions and countries with different kinds of inputs and outputs which 
can be expressed in different (monetary, physical) units. DEA does not require any 
assumption about the functional form of the transformation function and provides a 
single measure of efficiency without needing to assign prespecified weights to mul-
tiple inputs and outputs. It measures the efficiency of a decision making unit (DMU) 
relative to all other DMUs with the simple restriction that all other DMUs lie on or 
below the efficiency frontier. For each inefficient DMU DEA identifies the sources 
and level of inefficiency for each of the inputs and outputs.
The basic DEA model can easily be extended according to the research question or 
the field of applications (an extensive account is given, for example, in Cooper et al. 
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2007). One very useful modification is related to the situation where differing impor-
tance or priorities with respect to particular inputs or outputs are defined and should be 
taken into account. Accepting Rawls criterion and Feldstein’s argument for increasing 
social welfare—an increase in poorer household’s income generates higher social wel-
fare than an increase in richer households’ income—we propose the idea of an “assur-
ance region” DEA model.
Let us illustrate this idea using a very simple example with two outputs (the shares 
of income owned by two types of households, poor and rich, whose values add up to 
one) and three countries (DMUs). The data are given in the following table.
Country Output 1 Output 2 Input
A 0.3 0.7 1
B 0.7 0.3 1
C 0.5 0.5 1
In the output oriented model aiming at maximizing the aggregated sum of the out-
puts, the linear programming constraints associated with countries A, B, and C have 
the following inequalities in common along with the non-negativity constraint for all 
variables:
where v denotes the input multiplier and u1, u2 label output multipliers.
This is a very simple output oriented model where all three countries are effi-
cient (none of the countries is dominated by another one or a combination of the 
other countries). In order to demonstrate the role of weight for identifying the 
Charnes–Cooper–Rhodes (CCR) efficiency of DMUs, we will graphically show the 
efficiency frontier for this example in the weight variables (multiplier) space. Because 
there are only two outputs and one unitized input, we can plot a two-dimensional graph.
Dividing the inequalities constraints by v > 0, the following expressions are obtained:
(A)v − 0.3u1 − 0.7u2 ≥ 0
(B)v − 0.7u1 − 0.3u2 ≥ 0
(C)v − 0.5u1 − 0.5u2 ≥ 0,
(A)0.3
u1
v
+ 0.7
u2
v
≤ 1
(B)0.7
u1
v
+ 0.3
u2
v
≤ 1
(C)0.5
u1
v
+ 0.5
u2
v
≤ 1
565
1 3
Measuring income inequalities beyond the Gini coefficient 
Taking u1/v and u2/v as axes, the area P ≡ OP4P0P3 in Fig. 1 shows the set of feasi-
ble solutions for the above constraints. The line segments  P3P0 and  P0P4, where  P0 is 
intersection of the three lines describe the efficiency frontier.
All three countries A, B, and C are efficient. Any (u1, u2) on the line segment 
 P3P0 expresses the optimal weights for A, segment  P0P4 represents optimal combi-
nations of weights for B, and  P2P0 for country C. It is easy to see that the optimal 
weights for an efficient DMU need not to be unique.
In the spirit of Rawls we now postulate a higher weight for the income of the 
poorer households. For this purpose we introduce condition u2 ≤ 0.7u1 (ensuring that 
u1 > u2 and allowing for a graphically discernible representation). We thus require 
that the weight for the income of a poor household is at least 1.43 times higher than 
the weight for a rich household. In the empirical part of the paper, we will alter the 
lower bound for the weights ratio and analyse the effect of the change for the dis-
crimination power of our measure.
To analyse the influence of the assurance region method on the efficiency frontier 
and to illustrate our inequality measure, we add the weight constraint u2 ≤ 0.7u1 in 
the (v, u) space in Fig.  1. Dividing the weight restriction inequality by v > 0 and 
rewriting we obtain
The segment line OR corresponding to the equation, obtained by rewriting the 
above inequality intersects the segment line  P0P4 at point R in Fig. 2. Consequently, 
the feasible region in the (v, u) space is now represented by the triangle  ORP4, and 
u2
v
− 0.7
u1
v
≤ 0
Fig. 1  Feasible region P
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the line segments  P3P0 and  P0R are shut out from the efficiency frontier by the assur-
ance region constraint. The efficiency frontier is now described by the line segment 
 RP4 and the only efficient unit remains country B.
Taking a look at the data confirms that, this result is in accordance with eco-
nomic reasoning. The income’s share of household 1 (output 1 with higher weight) 
in country B is higher than in the other two countries.
To see the impact of the weight restriction on the efficiency scores of the DMUs 
A and C and to provide an interpretation of our DEA inequality measure we move 
the line segments  P3Po (which corresponds to country A) parallel to touch the effi-
ciency frontier at point R with coordinates u1/v = 1.1 and u2/v = 0.77. The efficiency 
score of country A is then
Thus the efficiency of DMU A drops to 0.869. Similarly, if we move the line 
segment  P2P5 parallel to point R, the efficiency of DMU C is reduced to 0.934. The 
impact of the weight constraint for country C is smaller than for A, which is not sur-
prising looking at the data in our example.
Summarizing, the inequality indicator obtained by an assurance region modifica-
tion of the CCR model is smaller or equal to one and describes the amount of out-
puts that must be redistributed in order to be projected on the frontier. The greater 
the redistribution that is needed, the lower the value of the resulting score. Unit 
value of the score indicates that the DMU lies on the efficiency frontier defining the 
benchmark and that no redistribution is needed.
0.3
u1
v
+ 0.7
u2
v
= 0.869
Fig. 2  Assurance region
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2.2  Assurance region programs
Extending the considerations from the previous section for more than two outputs 
and with more countries under assessment, the output oriented radial model, in the 
notation of Cooper et al. (2007) takes the following form.
where X and Y are input and output data matrices respectively (with n DMUs, m 
inputs and s outputs), u and v are multipliers, and while Q is a matrix of bounds for 
the output weights.
From the point of view of decision makers benchmarks providing theoretical sup-
port for redistributive politics are of the great interest. The proposed model projects 
observed data onto the efficiency frontier utilizing optimal solutions from the dual 
envelopment program
where τ are dual variables associated with weight restrictions in (4). The output 
projections of interest are then calculated by means of the optimal values λ* as 
퐲̂0 = 퐘훌
∗.
The RI index derived and illustrated in Sect. 2.1 assesses the level of inequality 
in a given period of time as the level of redistributions among households needed in 
order to be projected on the frontier.
This approach can be further utilized to analyse intertemporal changes in indi-
vidual countries and/or the shift of the frontier. For this purpose the Malmquist 
productivity index (10) is employed. Based on the pioneering work of Caves et al. 
(1982), Färe and Grosskopf (1992) defined the index in terms of distance functions 
triggering a mass of studies employing the approach in a variety of applications up 
until now.
(1)(R1) min퐮,퐯 퐯
T퐱0
(2)s.t. 퐮T퐲0 = 1
(3)−퐯T퐗 + 퐮T퐘 ≤ ퟎ
(4)퐮T퐐 ≤ ퟎ
(5)퐮 ≥ ퟎ, 퐯 ≥ ퟎ,
(6)max휑,훌,훕 휑
(7)s.t. 퐱0 ≥ 퐗훌
(8)휑퐲0 ≤ 퐘훌 +퐐훕
(9)훌 ≥ ퟎ, 훕 ≥ ퟎ,
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Expression (10) shows that the overall change in performance, in the case of the 
fixed input driven effectively by changes in the outputs, can be decomposed into two 
factors—the catch-up effect (C) and the frontier-shift effect (F).
A DMU0 represented by the activities (x0, y0)t, (t = 1, 2) is assessed in two time 
periods with respect to two technology frontiers in periods 1 and 2 by distance func-
tions dS, (S = 1, 2). Thus we compute the terms involved in (10) by solving linear 
programs of two types. Within scores are obtained by optimization
where 퐗S = (퐱S
1
,… , 퐱S
m
) and 퐘S = (퐲S
1
,… , 퐲S
s
) are input and output data matrices 
respectively for the period S.
Intertemporal scores come from the program in the form
This program is solved for the pairs (t, S) = (1, 2) and (2, 1). We thus employ the 
“exclusive” scheme (Cooper et al. 2007, p. 333) allowing the value of d in (12) to 
take on values lower than the unit in the sense of super-efficiency (Thomson et al. 
1986).
3  Empirical results
For an empirical demonstration of the RI index performance we consider 29 Euro-
pean countries acting as DMUs. The data were sourced from Eurostat and comprise 
the Gini index and income shares of disposable income of five quintile population 
groups based on the EU-SILC survey, the latter entering our model as five outputs. 
For the intertemporal analysis we collected data from 2  years—2007 and 2016. 
Concentrating on outputs we fix input to unit value. The input data matrix thus col-
lapses to a unit vector rendering the model robust to the returns to scale assump-
tion. To increase the discriminating power of the model, we can set the Rawlsian 
weights constraints in a stricter way, letting the ratio of the successive multipliers be 
bounded by a specified number l. Matrix Q from (4) will then take the form
(10)M = C × F = d
2(퐱0, 퐲0)
2
d1(퐱0, 퐲0)
1
[
d1(퐱0, 퐲0)
1
d2(퐱0, 퐲0)
1
×
d1(퐱0, 퐲0)
2
d2(퐱0, 퐲0)
2
]1∕2
(11)
dS
(
퐱0, 퐲0
)S
= max
휑,훌
휑
s.t. 퐱S
0
≥ 퐗S훌
휑 퐲S
0
≤ 퐘S훌 +퐐휏
훌 ≥ 0, 훕 ≥ 0,
(12)
dS
(
퐱0, 퐲0
)t
= max
휑,훌
휑
s.t. 퐱t
0
≥ 퐗S훌
휑 퐲t
0
≤ 퐘S훌 +퐐휏
훌 ≥ 0, 훕 ≥ 0,
569
1 3
Measuring income inequalities beyond the Gini coefficient 
where 0 < li,j < 1, i = 1, 2, 3, 4; j = 2, 3 4,5. In this way a sequentially constrained 
weights are embodied in the DEA model. We exemplify our approach by choosing 
the values for li,j from the matrix Q equal to 0.9. This implies the following decreas-
ing sequence of weights
Solving the assurance model for each DMU we calculate the RI indicator for 
2016 as well as optimal values for the weights and dual variables. In Table 1 the data 
and values of the RI index are displayed along with the corresponding value of the 
Gini index. The complete results for all countries can be viewed in Table 6 (“Appen-
dix A”).
The model determines four efficient DMUs with the unit score—the Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Norway, which are the countries with the lowest 
Gini coefficients. Noticeably, the Czech Republic gained its RI-efficiency from the 
massive income share of the first quintile income group (the poorest 20%). Slovenia 
and Slovakia (both relative efficient according to the RI) differ slightly in their Gini 
index at—24.4 and 24.3 respectively, with Slovenia offsetting an advantage in Q1 
(9.5 vs. 9.3) by a poorer value in Q2 (14.9 vs. 15.2). Germany and Ireland with the 
same value of Gini (29.5) are indistinguishable with the chosen ratio of weights. 
When compared to Hungary, Ireland’s share in Q2 and Q3 is lower (while Q1 are 
equal) which results in a lower RI score for Ireland.
A comparison of the results for the Czech Republic and Denmark for the year 2007 
(see “Appendix A”, Table 7) reveals the difference between our RI indicator (see col-
umn d11) and the Gini coefficient (see column G07). The lower Gini coefficient for 
퐐 =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
l1,2 0 0 0
−1 l2,3 0 0
0 −1 l3,4 0
0 0 −1 l4,5
0 0 0 −1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
u1 > u2 > u3 > u4 > u5.
Table 1  Data, RI scores, and the 
Gini index for selected countries 
(2016, l = 0.9). Source: Authors’ 
calculations
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 RI Gini
2 Bulgaria 5.6 11.4 16.2 22.6 44.2 0.966 38.3
3 Czech Republic 10.1 14.6 17.9 22.0 35.4 1 25.1
4 Denmark 9.0 14.2 17.9 22.2 36.7 0.993 27.7
5 Germany 8.2 13.5 17.7 22.8 37.8 0.987 29.5
7 Ireland 8.6 13.1 17.6 22.9 37.8 0.988 29.5
14 Lithuania 6.1 11.4 16.2 22.9 43.4 0.968 37.0
16 Hungary 8.6 13.9 17.8 22.9 36.8 0.991 28.2
23 Slovenia 9.5 14.9 18.7 22.9 34.0 1 24.4
24 Slovakia 9.3 15.2 18.8 23.0 33.7 1 24.3
25 Finland 9.9 14.3 18.0 22.4 35.4 0.998 25.4
28 Norway 9.4 15.1 18.5 22.4 34.6 0.999 25.0
570 M. Luptáčik, E. Nežinský 
1 3
Denmark (25.2) indicates a lower general extent of inequality than in the Czech Repub-
lic (where the Gini coefficient is 25.3). However the RI index for the Czech Republic is 
higher than for Denmark, reflecting the higher income share of the first quantile in the 
Czech Republic (10.1)—with the highest weight—compared with the income share for 
this group in Denmark (9.2). See “Appendix A”, Table 5 for further details.
Having demonstrated the sensitivity of the proposed measure, we derive results 
which are potentially useful for policy making. The projections for outputs suggest 
a desirable income share adjustment in individual quintile groups needed to perform 
at the best practice level. In this way, the potential identified for reducing income ine-
quality provides further important merit and difference of the RI indicator compared 
with the Gini coefficient. An example of selected countries is given in Table 2. Adjust-
ments in the table are computed as differences between the projection and the data, so 
positive values indicate the need to increase the share of a particular income group.
Naturally, in the Rawlsian sense the most massive redistribution would be needed 
in the “richest” quantiles as indicated by the negative values of the suggested adjust-
ments. Clearly, for efficient DMUs like the Czech Republic, no changes are needed 
and the adjustments are zero. Since projections add up to unity, adjustments add up 
to zero (proof in “Appendix B”). The extreme value for Bulgaria suggests a need 
for an extensive redistribution from Q5 (− 10.5). The complete results are given in 
Table 6 (“Appendix A”).
The intertemporal analysis was conducted by calculating the d-terms described in 
Sect. 2.2, labeled d11 and d22 (within the scores for 2007 and 2016) along with d21 
and d12 (intertemporal scores). Then the catch-up (C) and frontier-shift (F) effects 
as well as the overall Malmquist productivity index (M) were computed. A selec-
tion of countries is given in Table 3, the complete results can be seen in Table 7 
(“Appendix A”).
In Table 3, within the score for the period 2 (d22) is identical to the RI index (effi-
ciency score) for 2016 analysed above. The new insights provided by the RI index 
and its discriminating capacity in comparison to the Gini coefficient can be seen in 
Table 2  Income share 
adjustment (2016, l = 0.9). 
Source: Authors’ calculations
RI Adjustment
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
2 Bulgaria 0.966 3.7 3.8 2.6 0.4 − 10.5
3 Czech Republic 1
4 Denmark 0.993 0.3 1.0 0.9 0.8 − 3.0
5 Germany 0.987 1.1 1.7 1.1 0.2 − 4.1
7 Ireland 0.988 0.7 2.1 1.2 0.1 − 4.1
14 Lithuania 0.968 3.2 3.8 2.6 0.1 − 9.7
16 Hungary 0.991 0.7 1.3 1.0 0.1 − 3.1
23 Slovenia 1
24 Slovakia 1
25 Finland 0.998 0.0 0.4 0.1 − 0.2 − 0.4
28 Norway 0.999 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.5 − 0.7
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the example of Slovakia versus the Czech Republic. Slovakia’s Gini index changed 
from 24.5 to 24.3 between 2007 and 2016, i.e. to lower inequality. However, the RI 
approach indicates a deterioration in the Rawlsian performance by the M value of 
0.995 < 1, i.e. in the opposite direction. The Gini coefficient is an absolute measure of 
inequality while the DEA based RI index is a relative one. Inequality in Slovakia did 
decrease but the improvement was lower than the improvement in the reference coun-
try of the Czech Republic. The data for the Czech Republic and Slovakia reveals that, 
the share of the first quantile with the highest weight was at the same level in 2007 
and 2016 in the Czech Republic while in Slovakia it decreased from 10.0 to 9.3. The 
Gini coefficient dropped in both countries though the RI Malmquist index for Slova-
kia decreased too. This exemplifies the difference between the Gini and RI measures. 
On average, the productivity index M which is slightly below 1 (see Table 3) suggests 
less egalitarian distributions across Europe in 2016 compared to 2007 The efficiency 
frontier-shift effect defined by the most efficient countries reveals a deteriorating in 
the best practice itself. Most individual catch–up is observed in Portugal, Romania, 
Poland, and Ireland contributing heavily to the general improvement (M > 1). Less 
impressive progress has been made by Germany, Latvia, Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, and Switzerland (see Table 7, “Appendix A”).
In order to increase the discrimination power of our measure we sharpened the 
differences between the weights by reducing the value of li,j of to 0.7 (see Table 4 
and for more details Table 8, “Appendix A”).
The results show the decreasing values of the inequality indicators RI and increas-
ing discrimination in the country’s performance. Looking at the DEA results with 
respect to the peer group shows the improving performance of the Czech Republic 
(the country with the highest income share for the first quantile) due to the increas-
ing weight of the first group. The reference set for 2016 for all countries (excluding 
Norway) consists the Czech Republic only. This illustrates the dependence of results 
on the change of the coefficient l, describing the decreasing sequence of weights.
Table 3  The Malmquist index, its components and the change in the Gini index for selected countries 
(l = 0.9). Source: Authors’ calculations
d11 d22 d21 d12 C F M G2/G1
2 Bulgaria 0.970 0.966 0.973 0.963 0.996 0.997 0.993 1.085
3 Czech Republic 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.992
4 Denmark 0.995 0.993 0.998 0.990 0.998 0.997 0.995 1.099
5 Germany 0.983 0.987 0.985 0.985 1.005 0.997 1.002 0.970
7 Ireland 0.980 0.988 0.983 0.985 1.008 0.997 1.005 0.942
14 Lithuania 0.974 0.968 0.976 0.966 0.995 0.997 0.992 1.095
16 Hungary 0.995 0.991 0.998 0.988 0.996 0.997 0.993 1.102
23 Slovenia 1.000 1.000 1.025 0.997 1.000 0.986 0.986 1.052
24 Slovakia 0.998 1.000 1.009 0.997 1.002 0.993 0.995 0.992
25 Finland 0.994 0.998 0.997 0.995 1.005 0.997 1.001 0.969
28 Norway 1.000 0.999 1.018 0.996 0.999 0.990 0.989 1.055
Average (total) 1.001 0.996 0.997
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4  Conclusions
We developed a new measure of income inequality providing a deeper insight 
into the distribution of income than aggregated Gini coefficient. The perfor-
mance income distribution indicator has been demonstrated to favour more 
Rawlsian distributions. Projections computed from the model provide policy 
recommendations related to redistributional adjustments in particular income 
groups. The intertemporal analysis revealed a slight deterioration in income dis-
tribution towards a less egalitarian structure. This finding is, on average, con-
firmed by the increasing value of the Gini coefficient. The results show that a 
more clear-cut discrimination could be achieved by selecting the more restric-
tive set of weights. In general, the proposed relative indicator with its merits of 
providing deeper insights into income distribution among individuals, is meant 
to supplement and extend statistically based aggregated indicators like the Gini 
or Theil indices with information applicable for policy making. The restricted 
multipliers approach presents a promising avenue for examining poverty indica-
tors in a similar fashion.
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Table 4  The Malmquist index, its components and Gini change for selected countries (l = 0.7). Source: 
Authors’ calculations
d11 d22 d21 d12 C F M G21
2 Bulgaria 0.895 0.884 0.905 0.874 0.988 0.989 0.977 1.085
3 Czech Republic 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.999 1.001 0.999 1.000 0.992
4 Denmark 0.983 0.978 0.994 0.967 0.995 0.989 0.984 1.099
5 Germany 0.940 0.958 0.951 0.947 1.018 0.989 1.007 0.970
7 Ireland 0.934 0.960 0.944 0.949 1.028 0.989 1.017 0.942
14 Lithuania 0.910 0.893 0.920 0.883 0.981 0.989 0.970 1.095
16 Hungary 0.982 0.969 0.993 0.958 0.987 0.989 0.976 1.102
23 Slovenia 1.000 1.000 1.024 0.988 1.000 0.982 0.982 1.052
24 Slovakia 0.993 1.000 1.008 0.989 1.008 0.986 0.994 0.992
25 Finland 0.980 0.995 0.991 0.984 1.016 0.989 1.004 0.969
28 Norway 0.995 0.998 1.017 0.986 1.003 0.984 0.986 1.055
Average (total) 1.005 0.989 0.993
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Appendix A
See Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8.
Table 5  Income shares and the Gini coefficients data. Source: Eurostat
2007 2016
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Gini Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Gini
Belgium 9.1 14.1 18.4 23.1 35.3 26.3 9.1 13.9 18.4 23.5 35.1 26.3
Bulgaria 5.9 12.3 17.2 23.2 41.4 35.3 5.6 11.4 16.2 22.6 44.2 38.3
Czech Republic 10.1 14.5 17.7 22.1 35.6 25.3 10.1 14.6 17.9 22 35.4 25.1
Denmark 9.2 15 18.6 22.6 34.6 25.2 9 14.2 17.9 22.2 36.7 27.7
Germany 7.8 13.7 17.5 22.5 38.5 30.4 8.2 13.5 17.7 22.8 37.8 29.5
Estonia 7.4 12.3 16.8 22.5 41 33.4 7.1 12.1 17.1 23.9 39.8 32.7
Ireland 8.2 12.6 16.8 23.1 39.3 31.3 8.6 13.1 17.6 22.9 37.8 29.5
Greece 6.9 12.2 16.8 22.8 41.3 34.3 6.2 12.5 17.3 23.5 40.5 34.3
Spain 7.1 12.8 17.6 23.6 38.9 31.9 6.2 12.2 17.3 23.7 40.6 34.5
France 9.3 14.2 17.9 22.5 36.1 26.6 8.9 13.7 17.2 21.6 38.6 29.3
Italy 7.3 12.8 17.5 23.1 39.3 32.0 6.3 12.8 17.9 23.5 39.5 33.1
Cyprus 8.7 13.4 17.3 22 38.6 29.8 8.3 12.4 16.7 22.2 40.4 32.1
Latvia 6.6 11.7 16.5 23.4 41.8 35.4 6.6 12 16.9 23.3 41.2 34.5
Lithuania 7 12.4 16.7 22.7 41.2 33.8 6.1 11.4 16.2 22.9 43.4 37.0
Luxembourg 9.1 13.9 17.6 22.6 36.8 27.4 7.8 13.1 17.3 22.8 39 31.0
Hungary 9.6 14.6 18 22.5 35.3 25.6 8.6 13.9 17.8 22.9 36.8 28.2
Malta 9.1 14.1 18.3 23.1 35.4 26.3 8.9 13.3 17.7 22.8 37.3 28.5
Netherlands 9.3 14.1 17.6 22 37 27.6 9.2 14.1 17.9 22.6 36.2 26.9
Austria 9.5 14.4 17.9 22.3 35.9 26.2 8.8 14.2 18.2 22.8 36 27.2
Poland 7.6 12.8 17 22.5 40.1 32.2 7.9 13.4 17.7 23.1 37.9 29.8
Portugal 6.9 11.5 15.4 21.8 44.4 36.8 7 12.4 16.7 22.6 41.3 33.9
Romania 5.4 11.1 16.5 22.9 44.1 38.3 5.5 12 17.9 24.6 40 34.7
Slovenia 10.1 15.2 18.5 22.8 33.4 23.2 9.5 14.9 18.7 22.9 34 24.4
Slovakia 10 14.9 18.2 22.3 34.6 24.5 9.3 15.2 18.8 23 33.7 24.3
Finland 9.7 14.2 18 22.4 35.7 26.2 9.9 14.3 18 22.4 35.4 25.4
Sweden 10 15.2 18.7 22.7 33.4 23.4 8.5 14.1 18.4 23.2 35.8 27.6
United Kingdom 7.6 12.6 17 22.5 40.3 32.6 7.7 13 17.2 22.9 39.2 31.5
Norway 9.4 15.6 19 22.7 33.3 23.7 9.4 15.1 18.5 22.4 34.6 25.0
Switzerland 8.3 13.3 17.3 22.3 38.8 30.4 8.6 13.5 17.4 22.4 38.1 29.4
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Table 6  Projections of the 
income shares for l = 0.9 (2016) Score Adjustment
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Belgium 0.997 0.20 1.30 0.40 − 0.50 − 1.40
Bulgaria 0.984 3.70 3.80 2.60 0.40 − 10.50
Czech Republic 1 0 0 0 0 0
Denmark 0.997 0.30 1.00 0.90 0.80 − 3.00
Germany 0.994 1.10 1.70 1.10 0.20 − 4.10
Estonia 0.989 2.20 3.10 1.70 − 0.90 − 6.10
Ireland 0.994 0.70 2.10 1.20 0.10 − 4.10
Greece 0.988 3.10 2.70 1.50 − 0.50 − 6.80
Spain 0.988 3.10 3.00 1.50 − 0.70 − 6.90
France 0.995 0.40 1.50 1.60 1.40 − 4.90
Italy 0.989 3.00 2.40 0.90 − 0.50 − 5.80
Cyprus 0.991 1.00 2.80 2.10 0.80 − 6.70
Latvia 0.988 2.70 3.20 1.90 − 0.30 − 7.50
Lithuania 0.985 3.20 3.80 2.60 0.10 − 9.70
Luxembourg 0.992 1.50 2.10 1.50 0.20 − 5.30
Hungary 0.995 0.70 1.30 1.00 0.10 − 3.10
Malta 0.995 0.40 1.90 1.10 0.20 − 3.60
Netherlands 0.997 0.10 1.10 0.90 0.40 − 2.50
Austria 0.997 0.50 1.00 0.60 0.20 − 2.30
Poland 0.993 1.40 1.80 1.10 − 0.10 − 4.20
Portugal 0.989 2.30 2.80 2.10 0.40 − 7.60
Romania 0.987 3.80 3.20 0.90 − 1.60 − 6.30
Slovenia 1 0 0 0 0 0
Slovakia 1 0 0 0 0 0
Finland 0.999 0.01 0.44 0.12 − 0.16 − 0.41
Sweden 0.996 0.80 1.10 0.40 − 0.20 − 2.10
United Kingdom 0.992 1.60 2.20 1.60 0.10 − 5.50
Norway 1.000 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.47 − 0.68
Switzerland 0.994 0.70 1.70 1.40 0.60 − 4.40
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Table 7  The Malmquist index components (l = 0.9) and the Gini index (2007, 2016). Source: Authors’ 
calculations
d11 d22 d21 d12 C F M G07 G16
1 Belgium 0.992 0.995 0.995 0.992 1.003 0.997 1.000 26.3 26.3
2 Bulgaria 0.970 0.966 0.973 0.963 0.996 0.997 0.993 35.3 38.3
3 Czech Republic 0.999 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 25.3 25.1
4 Denmark 0.995 0.993 0.998 0.990 0.998 0.997 0.995 25.2 27.7
5 Germany 0.983 0.987 0.985 0.985 1.005 0.997 1.002 30.4 29.5
6 Estonia 0.975 0.978 0.978 0.975 1.003 0.997 1.000 33.4 32.7
7 Ireland 0.980 0.988 0.983 0.985 1.008 0.997 1.005 31.3 29.5
8 Greece 0.973 0.975 0.976 0.972 1.002 0.997 0.999 34.3 34.3
9 Spain 0.978 0.974 0.981 0.972 0.996 0.997 0.993 31.9 34.5
10 France 0.992 0.989 0.995 0.986 0.997 0.997 0.994 26.6 29.3
11 Italy 0.978 0.978 0.981 0.975 0.999 0.997 0.997 32.0 33.1
12 Cyprus 0.985 0.982 0.988 0.979 0.997 0.997 0.994 29.8 32.1
13 Latvia 0.970 0.974 0.973 0.972 1.004 0.997 1.002 35.4 34.5
14 Lithuania 0.974 0.968 0.976 0.966 0.995 0.997 0.992 33.8 37.0
15 Luxembourg 0.989 0.983 0.992 0.981 0.994 0.997 0.991 27.4 31.0
16 Hungary 0.995 0.991 0.998 0.988 0.996 0.997 0.993 25.6 28.2
17 Malta 0.992 0.990 0.995 0.987 0.998 0.997 0.995 26.3 28.5
18 Netherlands 0.990 0.994 0.993 0.991 1.004 0.997 1.001 27.6 26.9
19 Austria 0.993 0.993 0.996 0.990 1.000 0.997 0.997 26.2 27.2
20 Poland 0.978 0.986 0.981 0.983 1.008 0.997 1.005 32.2 29.8
21 Portugal 0.967 0.976 0.970 0.974 1.010 0.997 1.007 36.8 33.9
22 Romania 0.962 0.973 0.965 0.970 1.011 0.997 1.008 38.3 34.7
23 Slovenia 1 1 1.025 0.997 1.000 0.986 0.986 23.2 24.4
24 Slovakia 0.998 1 1.009 0.997 1.002 0.993 0.995 24.5 24.3
25 Finland 0.994 0.998 0.997 0.995 1.005 0.997 1.001 26.2 25.4
26 Sweden 1 0.992 1.024 0.990 0.992 0.987 0.979 23.4 27.6
27 United Kingdom 0.977 0.983 0.980 0.980 1.005 0.997 1.003 32.6 31.5
28 Norway 1 0.999 1.018 0.996 0.999 0.990 0.989 23.7 25.0
29 Switzerland 0.983 0.988 0.986 0.985 1.005 0.997 1.002 30.4 29.4
Average 1.001 0.996 0.997
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Appendix B: Sum of the projected income shares
Given the optimal solutions for λ, projections for s quintiles and n DMUs are given 
by
Table 8  Malmquist index components (l = 0.7) and the Gini index (2007, 2016). Source: Authors’ calcu-
lations
d11 d22 d21 d12 C F M G07 G16
1 Belgium 0.972 0.982 0.983 0.971 1.010 0.989 0.999 26.3 26.3
2 Bulgaria 0.895 0.884 0.905 0.874 0.988 0.989 0.977 35.3 38.3
3 Czech Republic 0.999 1 1.000 0.999 1.001 0.999 1.000 25.3 25.1
4 Denmark 0.983 0.978 0.994 0.967 0.995 0.989 0.984 25.2 27.7
5 Germany 0.940 0.958 0.951 0.947 1.018 0.989 1.007 30.4 29.5
6 Estonia 0.916 0.924 0.926 0.914 1.009 0.989 0.998 33.4 32.7
7 Ireland 0.934 0.960 0.944 0.949 1.028 0.989 1.017 31.3 29.5
8 Greece 0.907 0.913 0.917 0.903 1.006 0.989 0.995 34.3 34.3
9 Spain 0.923 0.910 0.933 0.900 0.987 0.989 0.976 31.9 34.5
10 France 0.973 0.966 0.984 0.955 0.993 0.989 0.982 26.6 29.3
11 Italy 0.924 0.921 0.935 0.911 0.996 0.989 0.985 32.0 33.1
12 Cyprus 0.950 0.941 0.961 0.931 0.990 0.989 0.979 29.8 32.1
13 Latvia 0.897 0.912 0.907 0.902 1.017 0.989 1.006 35.4 34.5
14 Lithuania 0.910 0.893 0.920 0.883 0.981 0.989 0.970 33.8 37.0
15 Luxembourg 0.965 0.944 0.976 0.934 0.979 0.989 0.968 27.4 31.0
16 Hungary 0.982 0.969 0.993 0.958 0.987 0.989 0.976 25.6 28.2
17 Malta 0.972 0.967 0.983 0.956 0.995 0.989 0.984 26.3 28.5
18 Netherlands 0.969 0.981 0.980 0.970 1.013 0.989 1.001 27.6 26.9
19 Austria 0.978 0.978 0.989 0.967 1.000 0.989 0.989 26.2 27.2
20 Poland 0.925 0.952 0.936 0.942 1.029 0.989 1.018 32.2 29.8
21 Portugal 0.890 0.920 0.900 0.910 1.034 0.989 1.022 36.8 33.9
22 Romania 0.870 0.902 0.880 0.892 1.037 0.989 1.026 38.3 34.7
23 Slovenia 1 1 1.024 0.988 1.000 0.982 0.982 23.2 24.4
24 Slovakia 0.993 1 1.008 0.989 1.008 0.986 0.994 24.5 24.3
25 Finland 0.980 0.995 0.991 0.984 1.016 0.989 1.004 26.2 25.4
26 Sweden 0.999 0.973 1.024 0.963 0.974 0.983 0.957 23.4 27.6
27 United Kingdom 0.923 0.941 0.934 0.931 1.020 0.989 1.008 32.6 31.5
28 Norway 0.995 0.998 1.017 0.986 1.003 0.984 0.986 23.7 25.0
29 Switzerland 0.943 0.962 0.954 0.951 1.020 0.989 1.008 30.4 29.4
Average 1.005 0.989 0.993
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and the sum of the projected shares is ∑s
r=1
∑n
j=1
yrj휆
∗
j
=
∑n
j=1
∑s
r=1
yrj휆
∗
j
=
∑n
j=1
�
휆∗
j
∑s
r=1
yrj
�
=
∑n
j=1
휆∗
j
.
Since the single input is fixed to 1 and projected onto itself, for the sum of 
lambdas we have
Thus the adjusted income shares generated by the model add up to unity.
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